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Introduction 
Buyer and supplier power dynamics can have immense effects on the outcomes of transactions 
and relationships. These effects can make or break a business, and thus, knowing how to manage 
them is essential to healthy business operations. This knowledge is particularly important for 
microbusinesses, defined as having 1-4 employees including the owner, because they inherently 
exhibit many of the attributes associated with the weaker player in buyer-supplier dynamics. In 
order to overcome the negative consequences that come with being the weaker player in a 
relationship, a microbusiness often has to work harder than other firms in the hope of securing 
favorable supply. Unfortunately, existing literature focuses on organizations that are larger than 
micro, or even small-sized firms, thus our understanding about the effect of the buyer-supplier 
relationship on a microbusiness is rather limited. Even less is our understanding about the 
strategies that a microbusiness can use to navigate unfavorable buyer-supplier power dynamics. 
The purpose of this thesis is to fill this gap, exploring power dynamics for microbusinesses and 
assessing if and how existing research can be applied to these unique entities. Using an 
established sociological framework, this thesis suggests some power balancing methods that 
microbusinesses can use to improve their position in their supply chain relationships to extract 
maximum value from their supplier relationships.  This thesis aims to provide practical actions 
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Power and Power Dynamics: An Overview 
Power 
“Power is at the heart of all business relationships” (Cox, 2001). It is defined as “the amount of 
resistance” one party can overcome before the other party yields to their demands (Emerson, 
1962). Hunt & Nevin wrote that “the concept of power is considered central in understanding the 
means by which one channel member can change or modify the behavior of another member 
within its channel of distribution” (1974). 
There are five sources of power: reward, expert, legitimate, referent, and coercive (French & 
Raven, 1959). The first four are considered non-coercive forms of power and can be separated 
from coercive power because they do not involve negative consequences as a result of 
non-performance (Hunt & Nevin, 1974). Expert power is how much knowledge one firm has 
over the other in a given situation, legitimate power is the belief that another firm has authority 
Types of power are: technical, knowledge, social, logistic, administrative, historic, economic, 
technological, and political (as cited in Johnsen & Ford, 2008, p.473). A firm’s “possession of 
resources determines the player’s power” and the amount of power it has is determined by how 
“valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable” those resources are (as cited in Bastl, Choi, & 
Johnson, 2013).  
Power Dynamics  
The complexity of relationships make examining a relationship and defining its power dynamics 
extremely challenging. One of the difficulties with understanding power between two parties is 
that power is inextricably linked with dependence. The more a party depends on resources 
another party has, the less power they have to gain access to the things they need or want. The 
dependence of one party is “directly proportional” to the other party’s “​motivational investment​” 
in the goals of that party, and “inversely proportional to the availability of those goals” outside of 
the dyadic relationship (Emerson, 1962).  
Another difficulty with understanding power dynamics is that relationship dynamics are 
constantly changing. Every action or inaction on behalf of either party can shift the balance; 
additionally there are multiple external forces that can change the power dynamic. These forces 
include political, economic, sociocultural, technological, environmental, and legal factors.  
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Power dynamics have been studied in many supply chain contexts by many researchers; 
however, it is impossible to study all of the factors that affect power dynamics simultaneously, 
and as such, researchers have been forced to focus on specific characteristics in their studies. 
Characteristics that can affect power in relationships include: the saturation of buyers or 
suppliers in the market, the percentage market share held by the buyer or supplier, the level of 
dependence the buyer or supplier has on the other party for revenue, switching costs, the 
attractiveness of the buyer or suppliers’ account to the other party, the originality of the product 
or service offered, the cost of searching for a buyer or supplier, and the amount of information 
that the buyer or supplier has about the other party (Cox, 2004). Other factors that affect power 
and cause asymmetries include firm size, (Villena & Craighead, 2017); relational capital, 
(Villena & Craighead, 2017), (Dyer & Singh, 1998); and legal bonds (Carey et al., 2011).  
Additionally, the economic and social nature of buyer-supplier exchanges (Villena & Craighead, 
2017) make power dynamics more complex. Behind every business relationship are people that 
add or take away relational “rents” (Dyer & Singh, 1998) in addition to the economic aspects of 
the exchange. The factors that can affect power dynamics in relationships listed above can be 
related to either economic or social aspects of these exchanges. (Villena & Craighead, 2017).  
Who Has Power When?  
There are four areas under which a buyer-supplier relationship can fall: buyer dominance, 
supplier dominance, firm interdependence, and firm independence. When the buyer is dominant, 
buyer power is high and supplier power is low. When the supplier is dominant, supplier power is 
high and buyer power is low. When the firms are interdependent, both the buyer and supplier 
have high levels of power in the relationship, and when firms are independent, both buyer and 
supplier power in the relationship are low (Cox, 2004). Figure 2, the power matrix, shows 
conditions under which each of these scenarios can occur. It is unrealistic to expect buyers to 
shift all of their relationships to a place where they are dominant, or in an equal place to their 
suppliers; however, buyers should work to move relationships to a place where they get the best 
quality and cost from their suppliers (Cox, 2001).  
Relationship Types 
Within the power matrix, relationships can be adversarial or non-adversarial and arm’s length or 
collaborative (Cox, 2004).  
Typically, arm’s length relationships have: “nonspecific asset investments, minimal information 
exchange…separable technological and functional systems within each firm that are 
characterized by low levels of interdependence and low transaction costs and minimal 
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investments in governance mechanisms” (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Although much of the supply 
chain literature is focused on collaborative relationships, arm’s length relationships are typical of 
most supply chain relationships and tend to be short-term (Cox, 2004).  
Collaborative relationships are characterized by “relational rents,” defined as “supernormal profit 
jointly generated in an exchange relationship that cannot be generated by either firm in isolation 
and can only be created through the joint idiosyncratic contributions of the specific alliance 
partners.” Relational rents can be accrued over time, and can provide significant advantages for 
the partners (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Collaboration is unique because it encompasses both 
economic and social aspects of exchanges. In collaboration, buyers and suppliers share detailed 
information about their operational processes, future developments and needs, and link their 
operations (Cox, 2004).  
Buyer Sourcing Options 
According to Cox, before buyers can implement their sourcing options, they must understand the 
power dynamic in the relationship, the external environmental factors that can affect the 
relationship, and the type of management style they should use for the sourcing method they 
choose (2004).  
In order to diversify buyer risk, buyers can use “short-term competitor or longer-term 
collaboration” to achieve their sourcing goals (qtd. In Cox, 2004). There are four different 
sourcing options for buyers: supplier development, supplier selection, supply chain management, 
and supply chain sourcing. The first two are concerned specifically with first-tier suppliers with 
supplier development representing a collaborative, long-term approach to sourcing and supplier 
selection representing short-term contracting type relationships that are typical of most sourcing 
relationships (Cox, 2004).  
Supplier selection involves a buyer looking at available suppliers and deciding which will best 
meet their needs whilst balancing their economic restrictions. The buyer will give the supplier 
information about their specific needs for that product, but will have no involvement in how their 
order is executed and little involvement in any kind of supply innovation (Cox, 2004). This is the 
easiest sourcing method for microbusinesses as it requires the least amount of resource 
investment and allows the firm to stay agile; however, its reactive instead of proactive nature 
means that a firm cannot extract as much value from their supply chain.  
Supplier development is a proactive approach to sourcing that involves shifting the 
buyer-supplier relationship from arms-length to collaborative. In this type of sourcing, the buyer 
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and supplier will share information, creating transparency and allowing the parties to make 
specific changes to their businesses to extract maximum value from the relationship (Cox, 2004).  
The other sourcing options become especially relevant for larger organizations with more than 
one tier of suppliers. However, it is worth noting that the smaller amount of complexity that can 
come with managing only one tier of suppliers can be an immense benefit to microbusinesses. 
Supply chain management represents a proactive method that works to develop suppliers at 
every level of the supply chain. It requires vast investments of both time and resources, 
significant involvement of buyers and a long-term commitment to their suppliers. Supply chain 
sourcing involves selecting suppliers throughout the supply chain as opposed to merely first-tier 
suppliers and, like supplier selection is usually transacted at arms-length.  
Microbusiness Defined 
A microbusiness is defined as a company of 1-4 people including the owner. According to the 
2014 US Census, microbusinesses made up 61.77% of all US firms, and 4.91% of employment. 
In Oregon, 59.15% of firms were microbusinesses and they made up 6.13% of Oregon 
employment. At the end of 2014, Oregon was home to 1.48% of US microbusinesses and 1.25% 
of the US population (at the beginning of 2015). This is significant because it means that 
Oregon’s microbusinesses are employing more than the US average and more than their share of 
the US population. See Figure 1 for further details.  
Power Dynamics for Microbusinesses 
The factors that affect power dynamics listed above included external factors, market factors, 
and specific business relationship factors.  
 
External factors can benefit microbusinesses, or they can be particularly devastating because 
microbusinesses may not have capital to wait out market changes, adjust to of affect political or 
regulatory changes, or adapt to fast-paced technological changes.  
 
Market factors are impossible for a microbusiness to control: unlike vast corporations, they 
simply don’t have the capital to buy out other players in their industry to change the market 
dynamics or quash their competitors. In fact, microbusinesses are vulnerable to this type of 
buyout or takeover themselves. One factor that is an advantage for microbusinesses is their 
ability to be agile in the market. Unlike larger businesses who many have entered into extensive 
contracts to secure supply, microbusinesses are more likely to be able to pivot and thus secure 
more favorable supply when necessary. Additionally, Microbusinesses are also in a unique 
position to be developed by their customers and as such can create high switching costs for those 
customers.  
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Relationship-specific factors are where a microbusiness has the most control. Given their small 
size, they can build close relationships with their suppliers because more often than not, the same 
person is in charge of the account which is more conducive to building trust in the relationship. 
This means it is easier to build the relational “rents” referred to by Dyer & Singh (1998) and 
Villena & Craighead (2017). However, if there are personality clashes between the buyer and 
supplier, this can work against a microbusiness because they cannot simply replace the account 
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Solutions to Power Imbalances Between Firms and their 
Suppliers 
There are two potential ways for microbusinesses to work with power asymmetries in their 
supplier relationships: understanding or management.  
Value Appropriation and Management Styles 
Understanding where a firm stands in relation to their supplier can help them decide what type of 
relationship they should foster (Cox, 2004). A firm can use this understanding to be reactive and 
understand the options they have when communicating with their suppliers or they can use 
understanding to be proactive and develop management styles and relationships that will 
leverage their position to build a strong supply chain.  
Sociological Perspective 
Alternatively, microbusinesses can try to change the balance of power in their relationships with 
their suppliers. Because business to business relationships demand personal interaction, we can 
look to sociology to formulate potential recommendations for microbusinesses who are working 
with power imbalances. It is important to understand that because power is inextricably linked 
with dependence, a firm can plan their strategy, but only mediate the other party’s response. 
Emerson states that his sociological research can be applied “to more complex community 
relations” (1962). This, and the personal nature of business relationships means that the 
sociological research is an ideal framework to apply to business to business relationships. 
Emerson suggests that there are four ways to change the balance of power in a relationship. 
Motivational Withdrawal 
The first is “motivational withdrawal” of the weaker, more dependent party. This can happen 
when the weaker party can no longer cope with the requirements of the other party; parties tend 
to distance themselves from relationships that are consistently not in their favor (1962). When a 
stronger firm uses its power, it makes the weaker firm resent them and “reduces...willingness to 
cooperate” (qtd. in Crook & Combs, 2007). Although not something the weaker party can 
control, it is important for powerful firms to mind when and how they exercise their power 
because it may be enough for the weaker firm to withdraw from the relationship altogether.  
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Extension of Power Network 
Emerson’s second method for changing the balance of power in a relationship uses the idea that 
interactions between two players affect, and are affected by, their relationships with other parties 
that they are connected to. Increasing the size of a network decreases the power of the strong and 
can make relationships more balanced. This method involves the “​diffusion ​of dependency into 
new relations in a network” (1962). In the world of business, this addition of players is not 
necessarily something that can be decided by any one player in the industry and is more a 
function of how accessible the market is to enter.  
Emergence of Status 
Emerson’s third method for changing the balance of power in a relationship is “emergence of 
status.” Weaker players can increase their power in a relationship by recognizing the powerful 
player’s status and their high value to the relationship. Doing so increases the powerful player’s 
“motivational investment in the relation” (1962). Research on this area in the supply chain 
management field is lacking, but this could be considered a form of relational capital building 
and studied further in that context.  
Coalitions and Strategic Alliances 
Emerson’s fourth method for changing the balance of power in a relationship is for two weaker 
parties to join together to interact with the stronger party (1962). This relationship can take either 
of two forms: a coalition (Bastl, Choi, & Johnson, 2013), or a strategic alliance. The two are 
distinctly different across four areas: “purpose, focus, duration, and relationship formalization” 
(Bastl, Choi, & Johnson, 2013). Coalitions can take place between individuals, interest groups or 
nations and strategic alliances usually take place across organizations. Both are deliberately 
constructed, but coalitions are focused on specific issues where the overall goals of each party do 
not align and each’s goal lies outside of the coalition, whereas strategic alliances are focused on 
overall strategy, where the organizations’ goals are aligned with one another. Coalitions are 
informal, short-term groups, but strategic alliances are formal, highly cooperative, and designed 
to be long-term, despite inherent instability (Bastl, Choi, & Johnson, 2013).  
The effects of forming coalitions have been studied in a supply chain context. Coalitions are 
defined as “a temporary, means-oriented alliance among players with different goals” (as cited in 
Bastl, Choi, & Johnson, 2013). Coalition forming shifts the dyadic nature of supply chain 
relationships into triads and larger networks (Bastl, Choi, & Johnson, 2013). This option is ideal 
if the two weaker parties can both benefit from their interactions with the stronger party; its focus 
is on increasing the strength of the weaker parties instead of decreasing the strength of the 
stronger party (Emerson, 1962). The addition of a third member into the relationship inherently 
10 of 23 
Danielle Lessler THESIS Spring 2017 
changes the nature of the original relationship (Emerson, 1962), (Bastl, Choi, & Johnson, 2013), 
and can bring it from an adversarial state to a collaborative one (Bastl, Choi, & Johnson, 2013). 
One of the key advantages of being a microbusiness is the ability to pivot whenever the needs of 
the business demand doing so, and as such, a coalition is ideal for this type of firm because of its 
short-term, project goal-based nature.  
Other Supply Chain Perspectives 
Relational capital is concerned with the social exchange side of buyer-supplier relationships. 
Size is one of the most discerning factors in power asymmetries from an economic standpoint, 
but relational capital does not discriminate based on size. Villena & Craighead studied size and 
relational capital asymmetries, finding that “a buyer perceives lower benefits whether the buyer 
is bigger or smaller and when the supplier has higher relational capital” (2017). Relational 
capital research is still in its infancy and researchers have reached varying conclusions on how 
much it positively affects performance and its negative aspects. However, it appears that it is 
important for firms to consider, because “if not effectively managed…[it] can become a liability 
in the form of perceived opportunism” (Villena & Craighead, 2016). Building relational capital, 
or “Shared ambitions, goals, vision and values” can “help foster trust, identification and 
obligation within the relationship” (Carey et al., 2011). 
To manage relational capital, firms should strive to be transparent in their discussions with 
suppliers, “avoid ambiguity in negotiations,” consider how changes to the account will be 
perceived by the other party (Villena & Craighead, 2016), ensure that the relationship is 
governed by legal bonds, and engage in social events outside of what is required by the 
relationship (Carey et al., 2011). Carey et al. found that “organized social events and team 
building between buyer and supplier facilitate interaction, enabling buyers to personally evaluate 
the trustworthiness and commitment of supplier representatives.” Relational capital facilitates 
information sharing between buyer and supplier, leading to better performance and better 
innovation (2011). It is important to note that although this study was conducted for the most 
part on large companies and their suppliers, this information is applicable to microbusinesses 
because they are able to have the same person interact with their suppliers much more 
consistently than large firms. Additionally, legal bonds have significantly positive effects on the 
levels of relational capital (Carey et al., 2011). Contracts encourage important communication 
between parties at the inception of a relationship and provide legal protection to both parties in 
the event that either the social exchange or economic aspects of relationship fail.  
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Power Dynamics and Solutions for Microbusinesses 
Client Profile 
To provide context for how power dynamics affect microbusinesses, the above literature review 
will be placed in context of a case study.  To preserve anonymity, the client to whom we 
provided consulting to in our Spring term 2017 BA 495: Business Strategy course will be 
referred to hereafter as “Client.” 
The Client produces artisan preserves from local Oregon produce including berries and stone 
fruits. According to the three generic business competencies, the Client’s competence is 
transformation, or “the ability to create innovative supply offerings by adding value to supply 
inputs and outputs (Cox, 2000). At the time of writing, the Client was a one-person business and 
had 15 suppliers of various sizes. Some supplier relationships are collaborative and others are 
arms length. As the Client grows, they will be in a position to implement contracts instead of 
casually buying when necessary. The majority of the Client’s relationships fall into the “supplier 
selection” category, but vital raw materials relationships fall under “supplier development.”  
Client Supplier Information 
Most of the Client’s supplier relationships are supplier dominant arm’s-length relationships, but 
there are a number of supplier dominant collaborative relationships and one reciprocal 
collaborative relationship. See Figure 3 for a detailed breakdown of the Client’s suppliers and 
statistics.  
During the Client project, the relationship with Supplier B that had been an arms-length 
relationship with an adversarial element changed and led the Client to seek a new supplier for 
that product. This product required that the Client incur significant switching costs for re-tooling, 
but they were planning on re-tooling with Supplier B within the next year. Although the timing 
of the re-tooling was inconvenient for the Client, ultimately, this ​Motivational Withdrawal ​led to 
a supplier relationship that gives the Client better price, a product that more closely matches their 
needs, and a supplier who is able to give them the flexibility they need. Supplier B exerted power 
by showing a lack of flexibility and inability to deliver to the Client which, although not 
something the Client can directly control, is something the Client can consider when selecting 
suppliers in the future. This is an example of how supply chain management is not simply about 
getting the best price for supplies but is about getting “the best products at the best value 
considering the risks and costs” (Wong, 2016).  
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Client-Specific Recommendations 
Our Business Capstone group is providing the Client with a projected purchasing schedule for 
this year and two future years. This involved working back from sales/ending inventory and 
using recipes to calculate how much of every supply the Client used in 2016. The schedule 
provides a list of supplies and suggests when they should be purchased in order to secure 
optimum supply price and to take advantage of any volume discounts available. Additionally, the 
Client can use this schedule to decide whether or not there are suppliers with whom they can 
make contracts to guarantee specific levels of supply or pricing. Doing this will allow the Client 
to reduce their cost of goods sold and increase their profit margins. Additionally, it will allow the 
Client to take advantage of when raw material prices are low because they will have an accurate 
count of purchasing needs.  
When building future relationships, potentially with cold storage suppliers or new raw material 
suppliers, the Client should consider how important the relational capital side of their 
relationships are to avoid future relationships that have adversarial elements. In the context of the 
Client, the more current the information, the easier they can create new products to adapt to the 
changing environment. Since the Client frequently spends time with their suppliers, including 
some time spent in a more social context, social capital is naturally built. The Client should seek 
to build relational rents with suppliers that are currently characterized as arms-length so that 
collaborative relationships are a possibility in the future. These should initially be coalitions, but 
the Client can begin to look for opportunities to create a strategic alliance. A coalition would be 
optimum for the Client at this key time in their growth because they need to maintain flexibility 
in their supply chain in order to extract maximum value. It is essential that the Client begin 
implementing legal bonds with appropriate suppliers to protect themselves and because it will 
help them build relational capital. Finally, continuing to withdraw from relationships, 
(​Motivational Withdrawal)​, that are not meeting the Client’s needs and moving on to 
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Conclusion and Future Research 
In conclusion, it is essential for microbusinesses to understand where their supplier relationships 
fall in the power matrix so that they can decide how best to manage, or change, the imbalance of 
power in those relationships. In order to manage power and its imbalances, microbusinesses can 
withdraw from adverse supplier relationships, try to help new entrants into the market to reduce 
the power of one player, form coalitions or strategic alliances, and work to build relational 
capital. Now that the Client has a forecast of their materials needs for the next 2 years, they can 
use legal bonds, motivational withdrawal, and coalitions to help secure ongoing favorable supply 
that can be flexible. Finally, they can begin to explore strategic alliance opportunities for the 
long-term.  
In the future, this work should be extended to include methodological research. It should consist 
of a dyadic survey of microbusinesses and their suppliers that asks about perceived power in 
their buyer-supplier relationships. This will help us to understand whether or not there is a 
disconnect between how much power microbusinesses think they have and how much they could 
have. Helping weaker firms understand their power position and how they can leverage their 
business assets most effectively will help more of them succeed in the long term.  
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Appendices 
Figure 1 - Business Census Data 
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Figure 2 - Cox Power Matrix 
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Supplier J 5.66% 2 3-5 Private 
Supplier-Dominant 
Arms-Length 






18 of 23 
Danielle Lessler THESIS Spring 2017 
Bibliography 
Bastl, M., Johnson, M., & Choi, T. Y. (2013). Who's Seeking Whom? Coalition Behavior of a 
Weaker Player in Buyer-Supplier Relationships. ​Journal of Supply Chain Management,​ ​49​(1), 
8-28. doi:10.1111/j.1745-493x.2012.03274.x 
Benton, W., & Maloni, M. (2005). The influence of power driven buyer/seller relationships on 
supply chain satisfaction. ​Journal of Operations Management,23​(1), 1-22. 
doi:10.1016/j.jom.2004.09.002  
Brown, J.R., Lusch, R.F., Nicholson, C.Y. (1995). Power and relationship commitment: their 
impact on marketing channel member performance. ​Journal of Retailing​ 71 (4), 363–392.  
Carey, S., Lawson, B., & Krause, D. R. (2011). Social capital configuration, legal bonds and 
performance in buyer–supplier relationships. ​Journal of Operations Management,​ ​29​(4), 
277-288. doi:10.1016/j.jom.2010.08.003 
Cox, A. (2001). Managing with Power: Strategies for Improving Value Appropriation from 
Supply Relationships. ​The Journal of Supply Chain Management,​ ​37​(2), 42-47. 
doi:10.1111/j.1745-493x.2001.tb00099.x 
Cox, A. (1999). Power, value and supply chain management. ​Supply Chain Management: An 
International Journal,​ ​4​(4), 167-175. doi:10.1108/13598549910284480 
Cox, A. (2004). The art of the possible: relationship management in power regimes and supply 
chains. ​Supply Chain Management: An International Journal,9​(5), 346-356. 
doi:10.1108/13598540410560739 
Cox, A. (2001). Understanding Buyer and Supplier Power: A Framework for Procurement and 
Supply Competence. ​The Journal of Supply Chain Management,​ ​37​(2), 8-15. 
doi:10.1111/j.1745-493x.2001.tb00094.x 
Cox, A., Sanderson, J., & Watson, G. (2001). Supply Chains and Power Regimes: Toward an 
Analytic Framework for Managing Extended Networks of Buyer and Supplier Relationships. ​The 
Journal of Supply Chain Management,​ ​37​(2), 28-35. doi:10.1111/j.1745-493x.2001.tb00097.x 
19 of 23 
Danielle Lessler THESIS Spring 2017 
Crook, T. R., & Combs, J. G. (2007). Sources and consequences of bargaining power in supply 
chains. ​Journal of Operations Management,​ ​25​(2), 546-555. doi:10.1016/j.jom.2006.05.008 
DuHadway, S. ​An investigation of the impact of trust, knowledge, and dependence asymmetries 
on relational performance in buyer-supplier dyads​. Diss. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, 
2016. 
Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998). The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy And Sources Of 
Interorganizational Competitive Advantage. ​Academy of Management Review,​ ​23​(4), 660-679. 
doi:10.5465/amr.1998.1255632 
El-Ansary, A., & Stern, L. (1972). Power Measurement in the Distribution Channel. ​Journal of 
Marketing Research,​ ​9​(1), 47-52. doi:10.2307/3149605 
Emerson, R. (1962). Power-dependence relations. ​American Sociological Review​ 27, 31–41.  
Gomes-Casseres, B. (1997). Alliance strategies of small firms. ​Small Business Economics​ 1, 
33–44.  
Gundlach, G. T., Achrol, R. S., & Mentzer, J. T. (1995). The Structure of Commitment in 
Exchange. ​Journal of Marketing,​ ​59​(1), 78-92. doi:10.2307/1252016 
Hunt, S., Nevin, J.R. (1974). Power in a channel of distribution: sources and consequences. 
Journal of Marketing Research​ 11 (2), 186–193.  
Jennings, P., & Beaver, G. (1997). The Performance and Competitive Advantage of Small Firms: 
A Management Perspective. ​International Small Business Journal,15​(2), 63-75. 
doi:10.1177/0266242697152004  
Johnsen, R. E., & Ford, D. (2008). Exploring the concept of asymmetry: A typology for 
analysing customer–supplier relationships. ​Industrial Marketing Management,​ ​37​(4), 471-483. 
doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2007.05.004 
Lorenzoni, G., & Baden-Fuller, C. (1995). Creating a Strategic Center to Manage a Web of 
Partners. California Management Review, 37(3), 146-163. doi:10.2307/41165803  
20 of 23 
Danielle Lessler THESIS Spring 2017 
Maloni, M.J., Benton, W.C. (20​00). Power influences in the supply chain. Journal of Business 
Logistics 21 (1), 42–73. 
Nyaga, G. N., Lynch, D. F., Marshall, D., & Ambrose, E. (2013). Power Asymmetry, Adaptation 
and Collaboration in Dyadic Relationships Involving a Powerful Partner. ​Journal of Supply 
Chain Management,​ ​49​(3), 42-65. doi:10.1111/jscm.12011 
Raven, B. H. (1992). A Power/Interaction model of interpersonal influence: French and raven 
thirty years later.​ Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 7​(2), 217. Retrieved from 
http://stats.lib.pdx.edu/proxy.php?url=http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/docview/129
2303175?accountid=13265 
Spillan, J. E., & Ziemnowicz, C. (2003). Strategic Management in Small Retail Businesses: The 
Case of Guatemala. ​International Small Business Journal,​ ​21​(4), 461-478. 
doi:10.1177/02662426030214005  
Stuart, I. (1993). Supplier partnerships: influencing factors and strategic benefits. ​International 
Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management​ 29 (4), 22–28. 
U.S. Census Bureau (2014). ​Number of Firms, Number of Establishments, Employment, and 
Annual Payroll by Enterprise Employment Size for the United States and States, Totals. 
Retrieved from https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2014/econ/susb/2014-susb-annual.html. 
Villena, V. H., & Craighead, C. W. (2016). On the Same Page? How Asymmetric 
Buyer-Supplier Relationships Affect Opportunism and Performance. ​Production and Operations 
Management,​ ​26​(3), 491-508. doi:10.1111/poms.12648 
Villena, V. H., Revilla, E., & Choi, T. Y. (2011). The Dark Side of Collaborative Buyer-Supplier 
Relationships: A Social Capital Perspective. ​Journal of Operations Management​, 29, 561-576. 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2220486 
Walker, E. (2004). What Success Factors are Important to Small Business Owners? ​International 
Small Business Journal,​ ​22​(6), 577-594. doi:10.1177/0266242604047411  
Wilkinson, I. (1981). Power, conflict, and satisfaction in distribution channels—an empirical 
study. ​International Journal of Physical Distribution and Materials Management​ 11 (7), 12–32.  
21 of 23 
Danielle Lessler THESIS Spring 2017 
Wong, D. (2016). [Powerpoint slides] 
Wuyts, S., & Geyskens, I. (2005). The Formation of Buyer—Supplier Relationships: Detailed 
Contract Drafting and Close Partner Selection. ​Journal of Marketing,69​(4), 103-117. 
doi:10.1509/jmkg.2005.69.4.103 
22 of 23 
